Market Representations of «-person Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The class of «-person games (without side payments) obtainable from a certain economic market model is characterized as the class of totally balanced games. Various market representations for a given totally balanced game are considered, and a finite commodity representation without production is obtained.
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