Community Investments and Collusion
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper will present a simple coin toss model which will illustrate the effect of collusion and its impact on the expected payoff for any given player. Such a game has direct links to community investment clubs where people are aggregating their investments. Without any knowledge about the impact of collusion such behaviour and its significant can be hard to detect. This paper will also review some previous studies on the topic of collusion.
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