Demanding or Deferring? The Economic Value of Communication with Attitude

We present and test a formal framework for expressing the idea that taking account of the multiple meanings conveyed by natural language may help economists to better understand the impact of pre-play free-form communication. We model coordination games where each player simultaneously requests others to take a particular action. We assume requests include two independent features: the desired action as well as the request’s “attitude”. We show that, in relation to one-dimensional signals, communication with attitude increases the rate of coordination on actions. We test our model both in Shanghai and Washington D.C. using laboratory implementations of complete information coordination games with pre-play communication. Consistent with our model, we find (i) natural language action requests are made with attitude; (ii) people consider both the requested action and attitude when making action decisions; and (iii) the use of attitude improves coordination. We also find evidence of gender differences. Although males and females recognize and respond to attitude equally well, females are more likely to send more demanding action recommendations than males, while males generally focus more on which action request to send rather than which attitude to use. Our results imply that, when requesting actions of another, it is important to be clear not only about the action but also the attitude with which the request is made. Knowing that transparent attitude can improve economic outcomes can benefit conversational and social media strategies in any social, economic or political environment.