Can’t Buy Me Rights! The Contractual Structure of Asymmetrical Inter-firm Collaborations
نویسندگان
چکیده
The efficient allocation of control rights in inter-firm collaborations is a widely emphasized issue. In this paper, I empirically identify control rights and the allocation of these rights using a unique survey data set on collaborations between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Fifteen control rights are identified to make up the structure of deals with five rights being the items of contention in deal making (ownership of patents, production, further development of the technology, the right to manage the collaboration, and the right to market universally). I find that the assignment of control rights is related to the bargaining position of firms and incentive issues. Hence, goliaths –pharmaceutical incumbents – subrogate critical rights to the new ventures when the final outcome of the project is depending on the venture’s effort.
منابع مشابه
Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact of intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances
This study builds on developments in transaction cost economics to examine how institutional environment and transaction (project) characteristics affect governance of inter-firm alliances. The focus is on the choice between equity and contractual alliance forms under differing regimes of intellectual property protection and other national institutional features. Empirical results identify tran...
متن کاملCapital Structure for Multinational Inter- and Intra-firm Innovation Collaborations
This study investigates how two competing capital structure theories: the pecking order and the static trade-off models, impact financing decisions in multinational interand intra-firm innovation collaborations. The results show that for the pecking order model, debt repayment, working capital, capital expenditure and operating cash flow are the main variables determining a deficiency in intern...
متن کاملTools and infrastructure facilities for controlling nonfunctional properties in inter-enterprise collaborations
Management on inter-enterprise collaborations (business networks) still face grand challenges especially in terms of managing interoperability of nonfunctional properties (NFPs) at various levels (technical, semantic, pragmatic). This paper identifies three categories of nonfunctional properties (collaborative for business level, contractual for communication issues, extrafunctional for computa...
متن کاملBreaking Up a Research Consortium
Inter-firm R&D collaborations through contractual arrangements have become increasingly popular, but in many cases they are broken up without any joint discovery. We provide a rationale for the breakup date in R&D collaboration agreements. More specifically, we consider a research consortium initiated by a firm A with a firm B. B has private information about whether it is committed to the proj...
متن کاملEconomic Evaluation of Fiscal Regime of Buy-Back Contracts in Comparison with Production Sharing Contracts (Case Study: Azadegan Oil Field)
F iscal regime is one of the main differences between petroleum contracts. Fiscal regimes in oil contracts are divided to two main categories namely Concessionary and Contractual Systems. In contractual systems, the main difference between service and production sharing contracts is the way of compensation of contractor services which could be in cash or in kind. In production sharin...
متن کامل