Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations1

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations∗

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. Journal of Eco...

Experiencing the Architecture of the Incomplete, Imperfect, and Impermanent

Sen no Rikyū and the Japanese Way of Tea: Ethics and Aesthetics of the Everyday

Sen no Rikyū (1522-1591) was a tea master who consecutively served Japan’s two warlords in the turbulent feudal era. Rikyū synthesized wabi tea into ethics and aesthetics by applying it to every aspect of the ceremony, from the tea setting to the physical environment, and from the manner of making and drinking tea to the way of interacting with the environment. By producing artifacts and enviro...

Economic-Statistical Design of a Control Chart for High Yield Processes When the Inspection is Imperfect

CCC-r control chart is a monitoring technique for high yield processes. It is based on the analysis of the number of inspected items until observing a specific number of defective items.  One of the assumptions in implementing CCC-r chart that has a significant effect on the design of the control chart is that the inspection is perfect. However, in reality, due to the multiple reasons, the...

Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games

We show that perfect monitoring is not necessarily the optimal monitoring technology in repeated games, unless players are both patient and have access to a mediator who can condition her recommendations on the entire history of actions and recommendations. This claim follows from three results. First, players can be better o¤ with unmediated imperfect (public or private) monitoring than with m...