Online Appendix for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
نویسنده
چکیده
Proof. First we prove the “if” direction. Fix agent 1 and preferences ✓1. Suppose that S1 is not obviously dominant in G = hH, , A,A, P, c, (Ii)i2N , gi. We need to demonstrate that there exists G̃ that is i-indistinguishable from G, such that G,G̃(S1) is not weakly dominant in G̃ . We proceed by construction. Let (S0 1, I1, h sup, S 1 , d sup c , hinf , Sinf 1, d inf c ) be such that I1 2 ↵(S1, S0 1), hinf 2 I1, hsup 2 I1, and u1 (h , S0 1, S sup 1 , d sup c , ✓1) > u G 1 (h inf , S1, S inf 1, d inf c , ✓1) (1)
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