Delegation and Organizational Design∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper concentrates on the question of organizational design under asymmetric information. The design of the organization has two parts: first, communication channels between the members should be established and second, the tasks should be allocated to the party that performs it in the most efficient way. We show that if the decisions are delegated to the agents, the agent’s decisions reveal the information they have to the principal. Delegation is then a mechanism to transfer information. Given that delegation is costly, the principal should decide how many decisions she delegates. In this paper, we show that delegation is only partial. The agents do not receive power over all decisions and some agents may receive power will the other will not even if they are identical. JEL-Classification codes: D23, D82, L22
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