A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
نویسندگان
چکیده
Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014