Justificatory Reasons for Action

Practical reasons play a central role in our everyday discourse about action and there is no major ethical theory into which the concept of reasons for action does not play a crucial role. However, the nature of reasons for acting is not well understood. Th e aim of the present essay is therefore to clarify the notion of justifi catory reasons for action. To accomplish this, I start, after some preliminaries, from a widely shared but oversimplifi ed model of practical reasoning. On this view, we have a reason for acting if this action is a necessary and available means to bring about one of our ends. I show that this view is mistaken. In particular, I argue that, contrary to prevailing opinion, desires do not provide an agent with justifying reasons for action. By discussing the necessary conditions for justifi catory reasons, I outline an account of practical reasons that is more sophisticated and more accurate than most theories of desire-dependent reasons, neo-Humeanism included.