Cognitive motivations of free riding and cooperation and impaired strategic decision making in schizophrenia during a public goods game.
نویسندگان
چکیده
Schizophrenia is generally characterized by various positive and negative symptoms that are accompanied by significant social dysfunction. Various researchers investigated the functional impairments in schizophrenia including impaired theory of mind (TOM), poor integration of affective and cognitive information, and malfunctioning of adaptive and strategic learning process. However, most of the studies were limited to simplified cognitive tests or computerized choice games that exclude real social interaction. The aim of the current study was to investigate human strategies based on the incentives and particularly the cognitive and emotional motivations of free riding. We examined the decision patterns of 41 healthy subjects (HSs) and 37 schizophrenia patients (SZ) during the public goods game (PGG), one of the games simulating human cooperation and free riding in group interactions. Strategic decision processes during the iterative binary PGG were assessed in terms of cognitive understanding, loss sensitivity, and TOM. We found that greed and loss sensitivity both motivated free-riding behavior in the HS, but that they were more vulnerable to greedy incentives than to possible loss. More significantly, the SZ clearly displayed a lower prevalence of free riding and distinct decision patterns from HS. Nonstrategic and unexpectedly low free ridings in the SZ likely arise from poor integration of cognitive and affective information. We suggest that loss sensitivity and TOM as well as cognitive understanding are involved in regulation of the free riding and cooperative behavior.
منابع مشابه
Decoding covert motivations of free riding and cooperation from multi-feature pattern analysis of EEG signals.
Cooperation and free riding are among the most frequently observed behaviors in human social decision-making. In social interactions, the effects of strategic decision processes have been consistently reported in iterative cooperation decisions. However, the neural activity immediately after new information is presented, the time at which strategy learning potentially starts has not yet been in...
متن کاملNeural Mechanisms of Free-riding and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game: An EEG Hyperscanning Study
The public goods (PG) game is a standard game design for investigating the cooperating and freeriding behavior of humans. The game models a simplified version of social interaction. The result of each trial is affected by the decisions of each player; thus, one should consider the number of cooperators and the result of the last trial. There have been several attempts to uncover the underlying ...
متن کاملDifferent Gain/Loss Sensitivity and Social Adaptation Ability in Gifted Adolescents during a Public Goods Game
Gifted adolescents are considered to have high IQs with advanced mathematical and logical performances, but are often thought to suffer from social isolation or emotional mal-adaptation to the social group. The underlying mechanisms that cause stereotypic portrayals of gifted adolescents are not well known. We aimed to investigate behavioral performance of gifted adolescents during social decis...
متن کاملDemocracy under uncertainty: the wisdom of crowds and the free-rider problem in group decision making.
We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contri...
متن کاملThe dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives
The empirical research on the public goods game (PGG) indicates that both institutional rewards and institutional punishment can curb free-riding and that the punishment effect is stronger than the reward effect. Self-regarding models that are based on Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies or evolutionary game dynamics correctly predict which incentives are best at promoting cooperation, but individ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Schizophrenia bulletin
دوره 39 1 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013