Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
نویسنده
چکیده
This article formalizes two proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem due to Geanakoplos and derives the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary. One formalization is based on utility functions, the other one on strict partial orders. For an article about these proofs see http://www.in.tum.de/∼nipkow/pubs/
منابع مشابه
Social Choice Theory in HOL Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
This article presents formalizations in higher-order logic of two proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem due to Geanakoplos. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is derived as a corollary. Lacunae found in the literature are discussed.
متن کاملArrow ’ s theorem and the Gibbard - Satterthwaite theorem : a unified approach *
The connection between Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is further strengthened by providing a single proof that yields both results. 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
متن کاملA topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory
Recently Eliaz (2004) has presented a unified framework to study (Arrovian) social welfare functions and non-binary social choice functions based on the concept of preference reversal. He showed that social choice rules which satisfy the property of preference reversal and a variant of the Pareto principle are dictatorial. This result includes the Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow (1963)) and ...
متن کاملBetween Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite; A representation theoretic approach
A central theme in social choice theory is that of impossibility theorems, such as Arrow’s theorem [Arr63] and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75], which state that under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to construct. In recent years, beginning in Kalai [Kal01], much work has been done in finding robust versions of these theorems, showing “approx...
متن کاملMechanism Design for the Environment¤
We argue that when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must be compelled to participate in a "mechanism" to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome. We survey some of the main findings of the mechanism-design (implementation-theory) literature such as the Nash implementation theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, and the Arrow/d'Aspremon...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Archive of Formal Proofs
دوره 2008 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008