A Case for Scientific Realism

When Galileo argued that the familiar patterns of light and shade on the face of the full moon cquld best be accounted for by supposing the moon to possess mountains and %as like those of earth, he was employing a joint mode of inference ind explanation that was by no means new to natural science but which since then has come to be recognized as central to scientific explanati&. In a'retroduction, the scientist proposes a model whose properties allow it to account for the phenomena singled out for explanation. Appraisal of the model is a complex affair, involving criteria such a s coherence and fertility, as well as adequacy in accounting for the data. The theoretical constructs employed in the model may be of a kind already familiar (such as "mountain" and "sea" in Galileo's moon model) or they may be created by the scientist specifically for the case at hand (such as "galaxy," "gene," or "molecule"). Does a successful retroduction permit an inference to the existence of the entities postulated in the model? The instincts of the working scientist are t o respond with a strong affirmative. Galaxies, genes, and molecules exist (he would say) in the straightforward sense in which the mountains and seas of the earth exist. The immense and continuing success of the retroductions employing these constructs is (in the scientist's eyes) a sufficient testimony to this. Scientists are likely to treat with incredulity the suggestion that constructs such as these are no more than convenient ways of organizing the data obtained from sophisticated instruments, or that their enduring success ought not lead us to believe that the world actually contains entities corresponding to them. The near-invincible belief of scientists is that we come to discover more and more of the entities of which the world is composed through the constructs around which scientific theory is built.' But how reliable is this belief? And how is i t to be formulated? This is the issue of scientific realism that has once again come to be vigorously debated among philosophers, after a period of relative neglect. The "Kuhnian revolution" in the philosophy of science has had two quite opposite effects in this regard. On the one hand, the new emphasis on the practice of science as the proper basis for the philosophy of science led to a more sensitive appreciation of the role played by theoretical constructs in guiding and defining the work of science. The restrictive empiricism of the logical positivists had earlier shown itself in their repeated attempts to "reduce" theoretical terms to the safer language'of observation. The abandonment of this program was due not so much to the failure of the reduction techniques as to a growing realization that theoretical terms have a distinctive and indispensable part to play in ~c ience .~ It was only a step from this realization to' an acknowledgment that these terms carry with them an ontology, though admittedly an incomplete and tentative one. For a time, it seemed as though realism was coming into its own again. But there were also new influences in the opposite direction. The focus of attention in the philosophy of science was now on scientific change rather than on the traditional topic of justification, and so the instability of scientific concepts became a problem with which the realist had to wrestle. For the first time, philosophers of language were joining the fray, and puzzles about truth and reference began to build into another challenge for realism. And so antirealism has reemerged, this time, however, much more sophisticated than it was in its earlier positivist dress. When I say 'antirealism', I make it sound like a single coherent position. But of course, antirealism is at least as far from a single coherent position as realism itself is. Though my concern is to construct a case for realism, it will be helpful first to survey the sources and varieties of antirealism. I will comment on these as I go, noting ambiguities and occasional misunderstandings. This will help to clarify the sort of scientific realism that in the end can be defended.