Rational Choice: Positive, Normative, and Interpretive

Among most economists, political scientists, and sociologists, it is taken for granted that the rational choice approach is a predictive methodology, and its strengths and weaknesses are judged in relation to that purpose. However, the rational choice model of action is found in a far wider range of disciplines across academia, and the purpose for which it is adopted varies greatly, with prediction, prescription, and interpretation each being seen by some as the model’s major role. In different disciplines, different purposes are emphasized, which often obscures the common assumptions shared and issues faced by their respective literatures, hence reducing the possibilities for interdisciplinary dialogue and shared theory development. This paper provides a broad, interdisciplinary survey of the positive, normative, and interpretive versions of the rational choice approach. It then discusses complementarities between these three subapproaches, showing how mutual borrowing of methodologies can lead to benefits for all of them. Introduction Rational choice is without question, in aggregate, the most broadly-embraced theoretical approach across the breadth of the social sciences and humanities. However, its sheer ubiquity is sometimes underestimated due to the immense diversity of forms that it takes across various academic disciplines, and the chronic lack of communication between those who use the rational choice model of action in its various guises. The basic understanding of the assumptions of the conventional rational choice model, which posits that actions are on the optimization of expected utility under the constraints of beliefs, are fairly consistent across disciplines. And each discipline, these assumptions have been the main point of reference for criticisms. Nonetheless, the way in which the model is used in its standard form, and thus the kinds of criticism it generates, varies greatly enough that the commonality of assumptions is rarely investigated. Perhaps as a result, possible complementarities between different rational choice literatures remain largely unexplored. One of the greatest sources of variation within the rational choice approach is the very purpose that the model serves. Sociologists, political scientists, and economics naturally tend to focus on the model’s role in positive theory. Indeed, to its proponents, its greatest strength is its suitability for generating falsifiable predictions across a wide range of action environments. Yet, in philosophy, there is a sizable literature that emphasizes its suitability to normative theory, while typically dismissing its usefulness in analyzing real-world action. Likewise, in anthropology, rational choice has been widely advocated and used primarily as a method for interpretation of foreign cultures, leading to one of the most notorious theoretical debates in the history of the discipline. This paper will begin by surveying the positive, normative, and interpretive uses of the rational choice model, and the intellectual exchanges that take place, or should take place, within each version of rational choice. After this survey, the paper will discuss ways in which work in normative and interpretive rational choice can both benefit and gain from cross-pollination with work in positive rational choice. Positive Theory In economics, sociology, and political science, the main advantage of the rational choice approach is typically seen as its ability to aid in the prediction of action, either at the individual or the collective level. Indeed, proponents typically argue