The Paradox of Confirmation
نویسندگان
چکیده
Idea: E [∼Ra &∼Ba] confirms H [(∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)] relative to >, but E doesn’t confirm H relative to some background K ≠ >. Question: Which K ≠ >? Answer: K = ∼Ra. Idea: If you already know that ∼Ra, then observing a’s color won’t tell you anything about the color of ravens. Distinguish the following two claims: (PC) ∼Ra &∼Ba confirms (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx), relative to >. (PC*) ∼Ra &∼Ba confirms (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx), relative to ∼Ra. Intuition (I). (PC) is true, but (PC*) is false. [Why? ∼Ra reduces the size of the set of possible counterexamples to (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx) [12].] Nice idea! Sadly, (I) is inconsistent with their confirmation theory!
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