Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency ?

نویسندگان

  • ATSUSHI KAJII
  • BEN POLAK
چکیده

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.

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تاریخ انتشار 2000