Lessons for the Future of Counter IED (C-IED) Operations

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) remain one of the most significant threats to conventional military forces. In spite of pioneering work by organisations such as the US Department of Defence’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organisation, the operational response has often been uncoordinated and incoherent. Some nations have successfully procured more resilient vehicles to protect their personnel. Others have made ad hoc modifications that provide limited improvements at great financial cost. Some nations have developed advanced mine detection systems that seldom work reliably in the field. Others have relied on risk assessment procedures that are often forgotten under operational pressures. The following pages draw a number of more detailed lessons from IED attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, it is argued that C-IED risk assessments must be updated to reflect changing local threat levels. They must also take into account the complacency that can expose vulnerabilities that will be exploited by insurgent forces. The comparison of previous attacks reveals wider problems. In many cases, personnel are exposed to increased levels of risk when they have to ‘work around’ routine equipment failures. In the aftermath of an IED blast, these failures have disastrous consequences as soldiers struggle to coordinate their response. In such circumstances procedures are often disregarded and communications protocols ignored. This reinforces the need for additional predeployment exercises strengthened by recent innovations in dealing with catastrophic accidents from civilian, safety-critical industries. The paper concludes by reiterating that operational pressures must not undermine the provision of specialised C-IED training both before and after deployment.