An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games

نویسندگان

  • Eran Shmaya
  • Eilon Solan
  • Nicolas Vieille
چکیده

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum deterministic stopping game with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite subgraph which is monochromatic.  2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; C73

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 42  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003