The semantic view , if plausible , is syntactic

Halvorson (2012) argues that the semantic view of theories leads to absurdities. Glymour (2013) shows how to inoculate the semantic view against Halvorson’s criticisms, namely by making it into a syntactic view of theories. I argue that this modified semantic-syntactic view cannot do the philosophical work that the original “languagefree” semantic view was supposed to do. According to Clark Glymour (2013), my argument against the semantic view of theories omits an important piece of information — namely, the model-theoretic account of theoretical equivalence given by de Bouvere (1965). I plead guilty to this charge. But, as Glymour points out, for a semanticist to avail herself of de Bouvere’s account, she must put language back into her account of theories. I claim that if we add language to the semantic view, then we have a syntactic view, indistinguishable from the oft-reviled “received view of theories.” Let’s call this modified view “semantic+L”. But if semantic+L is just the syntactic view, then the following sorts of claims are shown to be nonsense: A certain view φ about scientific theories is not plausible if one is thinking in terms of the syntactic view of theories. But if one adopts the semantic view, then φ proves to be defensible. Such claims are abundant in the philosophy of science literature. For example, van Fraassen has frequently claimed that earlier attempts at an empiricist philosophy of science were scuttled by the syntactic view of theories; but the semantic view allows for the consistent development of constructive empiricism. If Glymour is correct that the semantic view collapses into the syntactic view, then van Fraassen’s rhetoric cannot be maintained. Similarly, ∗Department of Philosophy, Princeton University. [email protected]