Computing Cournot Equilibria in Two Settlement Electricity Markets with Transmission Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
We formulate a two-settlement equilibrium in competitive electricity markets as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which each generation firm solves a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), given other firms’ forward and spot strategies. We implement two computational approaches, one of which is based on a Penalty Interior Point Algorithm and the other is based on a steepest descent approach. We apply the algorithm to a six node illustrative example.
منابع مشابه
Cournot equilibria in two-settlement electricity markets with system contingencies
We study Nash equilibrium in two-settlement competitive electricity markets with horizontal market power, flow congestion, demand uncertainties and probabilistic system contingencies. The equilibrium is formulated as a stochastic Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) in which each firm solves a stochastic Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). We assume a no...
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