Bargaining with an agenda
نویسندگان
چکیده
Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the KalaiSmorodinsky solution or many others.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 48 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004