Morality and Justice

Morality and justice have apparent similarities. Both facilitate social interaction, coordination, and cooperation. Both can feel like external standards that somehow should carry more weight than individuals’ preferences. That said, morality and justice are not synonymous. Scholars as far back as Aristotle have identifi ed ways that morality and justice differ (see Konow, 2008 ). In this chapter, we review research programs from the literatures on moral development , the social psychology of justice, and the burgeoning social psychological literature on adult morality and examine how scholars have conceptualized the relation between morality and justice. We review these literatures in roughly chronological order to illustrate how theorizing and research about morality and justice has changed over time. We fi nd a great deal of variability in how theorists have approached links between morality and justice. Some treat them as the same construct (e.g., classic theories of moral development; Piaget, 1932/ 1997 ; Kohlberg, 1981 ). Others view morality as one of several possible motivations for justice (e.g., Folger, 2001 ; Skitka, 2003 ). Still others argue that justice is merely one component of morality (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004 ). The goals of this chapter are therefore to (a) review these different perspectives on morality and justice, and (b) offer constructive critiques and identify ways that these theories might inform each other. We conclude that three separate literatures converge on the basic idea that morality and justice are distinct but related constructs. However, no consensus exists regarding more specifi c aspects of the relation between the constructs.