Reference Incomes, Loss Aversion, and Physician Behavior

نویسندگان

  • John A. Rizzo
  • Richard J. Zeckhauser
  • John F. Kennedy
  • Miriam Avins
  • George Borjas
  • Jim Burgess
  • Michael Coady
  • Avi Dor
  • Randy Ellis
  • Roger Feldman
  • Victor Fuchs
  • John Geweke
  • Robert Jensen
  • Joel Horowitz
  • Daniel Kahneman
  • Emmett Keeler
  • David Laibson
  • Doug Leslie
  • John Lindsey
  • Duncan Neuhauser
  • John Nyman
  • David Paltiel
  • Mark Pauly
  • Mark Rosenzweig
  • Paul Schultz
  • Andrei Shleifer
  • Amir Shmueli
  • Robin Sickles
  • Jody Sindelar
  • Frank Sloan
  • Doug Staiger
  • James Stock
  • Joel Waldfogel
چکیده

We examine the effects of reference income on the behavior of young male physicians. Using a unique panel of data, we relate each physician’s reference and actual incomes to their subsequent income growth. Reference income has a strong positive effect on subsequent income for physicians who are below their reference points, but not for physicians who are at or above their reference points. Loss aversion, which posits a kink in utility at the reference point, explains this puzzling pattern. Physicians respond strongly to shortfalls from the reference point -they take unappealing actions to boost earnings -because the marginal utility of income is steep in that range. Competing prominent theories, tested here, fail to explain these relationships.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Risk premiums and certainty equivalents of loss-averse newsvendors of bounded utility

Loss-averse behavior makes the newsvendors avoid the losses more than seeking the probable gains as the losses have more psychological impact on the newsvendor than the gains. In economics and decision theory, the classical newsvendor models treat losses and gains equally likely, by disregarding the expected utility when the newsvendor is loss-averse. Moreover, the use of unbounded utility to m...

متن کامل

Reference Points and Loss Aversion in Intertemporal Choice (Preliminary)

Reference points and loss aversion are two essential and commonly used concepts in behavioral economics. In this paper, based on insight of Loewenstein’s (1988) reference point model, we construct a structural model for intertemporal choice with reference points and loss aversion by considering four scenarios: delay of gains, delay of losses, speed-up of gains, and speed-up of losses. We use pa...

متن کامل

Loss aversion equilibrium

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In particular, loss aversion is an important element of such utility f...

متن کامل

Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In a repeated situation, the value of the previous payo...

متن کامل

9814 LOSS AVERSION IN REPEATED GAMES Jonathan Shalev

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In a repeated situation, the value of the previous payo...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003