Strategic Ignorance in the Second-Price Auction
نویسنده
چکیده
Suppose bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when bidders are sufficiently few. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price. JEL Codes: D44.
منابع مشابه
Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
This paper proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses to incompleteinformation games based on "level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in firstand second-price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) "cursed equilibrium...
متن کاملCommitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices
This paper models sequential auctioning of two perfect substitutes by a strategic seller, who learns about demand from the first-auction price. The seller holds the second auction only when the remaining demand is strong enough to cover her opportunity cost. Bidding in anticipation of such a contingent future auction is characterized, including a sufficient condition for existence of an inverti...
متن کاملAERB Special Issue I (Auctions)
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more “learnable” than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the “ ,” into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strateg...
متن کاملMechanism Design with Common Values
vi = θ1 + θ2 Assume for simplicity that the θi are i.i.d. random variables with a continuous density on [0, 1]. How would you bid in a first price auction? How would you bid in a second price auction? Does the second price auction have dominant strategy equilibria? Does the game have other equilibria that are similar to dominant strategy equilibria in some sense? Analysis of the first price auc...
متن کاملEquilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
We study a model in which the same set of bidders, with perfectly correlated valuations across units, compete for two units of a good in two sequential ascending-price auctions. The seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction. Surprisingly, the equilibrium has a simple structure; strategic nondisclosure of information (i.e., pooling) only takes the form of non-participation...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011