Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 14 September 2010 Available online 22 August 2013 JEL classification: D86
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 82 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013