The impact of deposit insurance on depositor behavior during a crisis: A conjoint analysis approach ¬リニ

We investigate the effectiveness of initiating deposit insurance at the outset of a banking crisis. Using a conjoint analysis approach that allows us to consider the simultaneous impact of multiple deposit insurance attributes and various counterfactuals, we ask a multinational sample of respondents how they would view hypothetical account profiles following the failure of a large competing bank. Previous experience matters: respondents from countries without explicit deposit insurance exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the introduction of deposit insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing bank runs. They also impose a higher deposit interest rate premium. Having a long-term bank relationship reduces withdrawal risk, as does the absence of co-insurance. 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2015.02.001 1042-9573/ 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc. q For helpful comments and assistance, we are grateful to Ken Cyree, Christie Smith, Anella Munro, Maros Servatka, Lars Kaiser, Toby Daglish, Aron Veress, Murillo Campello (JFI editor), and, especially, an anonymous JFI referee. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the University of Canterbury, University of Liechtenstein, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and we thank attendees for useful suggestions. Jake Van Diest and Matthew Hakemann provided invaluable research assistance. Finally, we sincerely thank the survey instrument respondents who helped make this research possible. ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (G. Boyle), [email protected] (R. Stover), [email protected] (A. Tiwana), [email protected] (O. Zhylyevskyy). J. Finan. Intermediation 24 (2015) 590–601