CRM - FIELDS - PIMS PRIZE WINNER : Allan Borodin

نویسندگان

  • Allan Borodin
  • Jon Kleinberg
چکیده

Allan Borodin of the University of Toronto has been awarded the 2008 CRMFields-PIMS prize. According to the citation “Professor Borodin is a world leader in the mathematical foundations of computer science. His influence on theoretical computer science has been enormous, and its scope very broad. Jon Kleinberg, winner of the 2006 Nevanlinna Prize, writes of Borodin, “he is one of the few researchers for whom one can cite examples of impact on nearly every area of theory, and his work is characterized by a profound taste in choice of problems, and deep connections with broader issues in computer science.” Allan Borodin has made fundamental contributions to many areas, including algebraic computations, resource tradeoffs, routing in interconnection networks, parallel algorithms, online algorithms, and adversarial queuing theory.”

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تاریخ انتشار 2008