Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result
نویسنده
چکیده
[Moore and Repullo, Econometrica 58 (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, Rev. Econom. Stud. 58 (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin’s classic paper [Maskin, Rev. Econom. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu, http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294, Inter. J. Quantum Information, 2010 (accepted)] shows that when an additional condition is satisfied, the Maskin’s theorem will no longer hold by using a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this result holds in the macro world by using an algorithmic mechanism. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of the algorithmic mechanism. The main result is: The sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents shall be amended, not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.
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