An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auction, iBundle Extend & Adjust (iBEA), maintains non-linear and perhaps non-anonymous prices on bundles of items, and terminates with the efficient allocation and the Vickrey payments in ex post Nash equilibrium. Crucially, iBEA is able to implement the Vickrey outcome even when the Vickrey payments are not supported in a single competitive equilibrium. The auction closes with Universal competitive equilibrium prices, which provide enough information to compute individualized discounts to adjust the final prices and implement Vickrey payments.
منابع مشابه
A Simple Ascending Generalized Vickrey Auction∗
We design a simple ascending Vickrey auction for the combinatorial allocation problem. We make use of a concept called universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price to design our auction. Our auction searches for a UCE price, which (along with an efficient allocation) provides enough information to compute the Vickrey payments of buyers. Our auction maintains non-linear and non-anonymous prices...
متن کاملAscending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of the auction (or alternativel...
متن کاملAscending Price Vickrey Auctions Using Primal-Dual Algorithms∗
The direct Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism requires solving underlying optimization problems of the main economy and of every “marginal” economy. We show that VCG outcome can be implemented using a competitive equilibrium (CE) of the main economy if and only if that CE price is also a CE price of every marginal economy. We call such a CE price a universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) pri...
متن کاملAscending auctions : some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts
When bidders are not substitutes, we show that there is no standard ascending auction that implements a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium under truthful bidding. Such an impossibility holds also in environments where the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff and is thus stronger than de Vries, Schummer and Vohra’s [On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects...
متن کاملAn Efficient and Incentive Compatible Ascending Auction for Multiple Complements1
This paper proposes an ascending-bid auction for efficiently allocating multiple complementary indivisible commodities. The seller has a reserve price for every bundle of goods and determines the quantity for sale based upon bidders’ reported demands. The auctioneer announces a price for every bundle of goods, every bidder subsequently responds with a set of goods demanded at these prices, and ...
متن کامل