Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities 1
نویسنده
چکیده
" We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.
منابع مشابه
Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
This paper studies (single-valued) solutions to housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. I show that a solution is monotonic if and only if it is coalition strategy-proof. I point out that the strong core solution is the only solution which is monotonic, individually rational and an onto function. (As Roth and Postlewaite (1977) showed, the strong core solution is sing...
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