Fregean versus Kripkean Reference*

Millianism is the view that, from a semantical viewpoint, proper names simply refer; there is no further semantically relevant function they play. As the case of indexicals makes very clear, most of the considerations in Naming and Necessity that people find plausible are compatible with the falsity of Millianism. Besides, there are good reasons to consider that thesis false. Millians grant that, over and above the referent, there is descriptive information associated with proper names which is, somehow, semantically significant. Nevertheless, they argue for their views by elaborating a distinction between properties of expressions which are relevant in a truly semantic sense, and features which are merely “metasemantical” and should not be taken into account in a genuinely semantic account. In this paper I take up these proposals, giving reasons to incorporate semantic features associated with proper names over and above their referent in any (genuine) semantic account of natural language. I also argue that my proposal is compatible with the main points made in Naming and Necessity, by contending that not Millianism but externalism was the claim most forcefully argued for in that impressive piece of work.