Optimal Antitrust Enforcement , Dynamic Competition , and Changing Economic Conditions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence
S hould the United States pursue a vigorous antitrust policy? Soon after the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, economists led by John Bates Clark (1901) argued that the enforcement of such laws should be informed by the prevailing economic theory on the merits of competition and the extent to which firms’ conduct can enhance or weaken competition. However, economic theory since then...
متن کاملAntitrust Enforcement ∗
This article explores the enforcement of those laws intended to promote competitive markets through the prohibition of certain practices such as price-fixing, welfare-reducing mergers, and monopolization. The discovery and prosecution of violations are examined including the role of leniency programs. The determination of penalties is investigated with an assessment of their relationship to opt...
متن کاملAntitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel profits. We derive the optimal fine schedule that achieves maximal social welfare under ...
متن کاملCompetition Politics: Interest Groups, Democracy, and Antitrust Reform in Developing Countries∗
This article examines the political origins of antitrust enforcement in developing countries. I consider how the organization and political influence of business affects governments’ commitments to competition policy institutions. The analysis predicts cross-class coalitions with contending regulatory preferences. An alliance of incumbent producers and affiliated labor groups (“insiders”) oppos...
متن کاملLeniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced ̄nes to ̄rms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give ̄rms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive e®ect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze the optimal policy under alternative rules and with homogeneo...
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