The Popular Roommates problem
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching problem in a roommates instance has been an open problem for several years and here we show it is NP-hard. A sub-class of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings has been well-studied in bipartite graphs. We show that the dominant matching problem in G = (V,E) is also NP-hard and this is the case even when G admits a stable matching.
منابع مشابه
Popular Matchings in the Marriage and Roommates Problems
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