On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.
منابع مشابه
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