The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman

نویسنده

  • Michael Strevens
چکیده

Fitelson and Waterman (2004)’s principal objection to Strevens (2001)’s Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens’s central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim.

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تاریخ انتشار 2005