Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in Lipman and Wang [2000] do have analogs in the case of infinitely repeated games.
منابع مشابه
Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in Lipman and Wang do have analogs in the case of infinitely repeated games [Lipman, B., Wang, R., 2000. Switching costs in frequently repeated games. J. Econ. Theory 93, August 2000, 149–190]. We also...
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تاریخ انتشار 2001