Monetary Equilibria with Indivisible Goods∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper uses a New Monetarist framework to study the trade of indivisible goods with divisible money in a frictional market. We first derive conditions under which stationary equilibrium exists, and then show that if equilibrium exits, it is unique. The uniqueness result is due to the commitment and coordination nature of the pricing mechanisms. Money is superneutral in the model with generalized Nash bargaining, but not with competitive search. Because of the superneutrality of money, monetary equilibrium in the generalized Nash bargaining model only exists for low values of nominal interest rate. With competitive search, monetary equilibrium exists for all i > 0. JEL: D51, E40
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This paper uses a New Monetarist framework to study the trade of indivisible goods with divisible money in a frictional market. We first derive conditions under which stationary equilibrium exists, and then show that if equilibrium exits, it is unique. The uniqueness result is due to the commitment and coordination nature of the pricing mechanisms. Money is superneutral in the model with genera...
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