Work ( s ) : Concentrated Corporate Ownership by Randall K . Morck
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چکیده
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منابع مشابه
Seminar in Law , Economics , and Organization
The extent to which firm ownership is concentrated or dispersed varies considerably from country to country. Explanations based on differences in the protection of minority shareholders leave a significant part of the variance unexplained. This paper offers a novel explanation for the variation in ownership concentration across countries based on differences in the quality of labor relations. W...
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Japan’s prolonged economic problems are due to more than faulty macro-economic policies. We do not deny the importance of bungled macro-economic policy, but argue that deeper maladies in Japanese corporate governance made that country increasingly vulnerable to such problems. We argue that Japan’s main bank and financial keiretsu systems left corporate governance largely in the hands of credito...
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Using firm-, industry-, and country-level data, we document a link between family ownership and labor relations. Across countries, we find that family ownership is relatively more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are difficult, consistent with firm-level evidence suggesting that family firms are particularly effective at coping with difficult labor relations. Our cross-country re...
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We show that differences in the quality of labor relations across countries can help to explain cross-country differences in ownership concentration. Controlling for minority shareholder protection, countries in which labor relations are hostile tend to have more concentrated ownership than countries in which labor relations are cooperative. Union strength, labor regulation, and the political o...
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Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) report different empirical findings regarding ownership structure and corporate profitability. In this paper, we re-estimate the relation between management ownership and firm's value after controlling for the history of management ownership as well as inter-firm differences using panel data. Further, ...
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