Social Pressure, Transparency, and Voting in Committees
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whosemembers fear being blamed by partisan observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that such social pressure, like optimal taxation, can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, institutions may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is too much. We also show that public voting is particularly desirable in committees with overly biased members or overly biased voting rules against the alternative.
منابع مشابه
Decision making in committees : transparency, reputation and voting rules
In this paper I analyze the e¤ect of the transparency of the decision making process in committees on the decisions that are eventually taken. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns, so that each member tries to enhance his own reputation. When the decision making process is secretive, the individual votes of the committee members are not exposed to the public but ...
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