Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Incomplete; Information

Discounted Repeated Games with General Incomplete Information

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, and such that the payoffs of the players depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm to find all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and...

Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games*

We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even w...

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your perso...

A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting

We introduce a “dynamic non-equivalent utilities” (DNEU) condition and the notion of dynamic player-specific punishments for a general repeated game with unequal discounting, both naturally generalizing the stationary counterparts in Abreu et al. (1994). We show that if the DNEU condition, i.e., no pair of players have equivalent utility functions in the repeated game, is satisfied, then any fe...