Asymmetric Reduced Form Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.019 Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-42849 Accepted Version Originally published at: Mierendorff, Konrad (2011). Asymmetric reduced form auctions. Economics Letters, 110(1):41-44. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.019 Asymmetric Reduced Form Auctions Konrad Mierendorff∗ Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland Abstract This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail.
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A Constructive Approach to Reduced-Form Auctions with Applications to Multi-Item Mechanism Design
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