Independent reinforcement learners in cooperative Markov games: a survey regarding coordination problems

نویسندگان

  • Laëtitia Matignon
  • Guillaume J. Laurent
  • Nadine Le Fort-Piat
چکیده

In the framework of fully cooperative multi-agent systems, independent (non-communicative) agents that learn by reinforcement must overcome several difficulties to manage to coordinate. This paper identifies several challenges responsible for the non-coordination of independent agents: Pareto-selection, nonstationarity, stochasticity, alter-exploration and shadowed equilibria. A selection of multi-agent domains is classified according to those challenges: matrix games, Boutilier’s coordination game, predators pursuit domains and a special multi-state game. Moreover the performance of a range of algorithms for independent reinforcement learners is evaluated empirically. Those algorithms are Q-learning variants: decentralized Q-learning, distributed Q-learning, hysteretic Q-learning, recursive FMQ and WoLF PHC. An overview of the learning algorithms’ strengths and weaknesses against each challenge concludes the paper and can serve as a basis for choosing the appropriate algorithm for a new domain. Furthermore, the distilled challenges may assist in the design of new learning algorithms that overcome these problems and achieve higher performance in multi-agent applications.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Knowledge Eng. Review

دوره 27  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012