Nash Equilibria in General Sum Games
نویسنده
چکیده
In this lecture we study basic solution concepts in game theory, namely the notion of dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium. We consider rational players in a competitive environment. A rational player is a player with priorities (or utility) that tries to maximize the utility (or minimize cost) while considering that other players are also rational. A competitive environment is an environment with multiple rational players.
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