Reconstructing Dewey: The Philosophy of Critical Pragmatism

The historical relationship between pragmatism and critical theory is one in which the antifoundational and practice-oriented dimensions of pragmatism appear to exist in tension, if not outright conflict, with the emancipatory commitments of the neo-Marxist legacy of critical theory. While Deweyan pragmatism is most often understood in its deliberative, experimental, open-ended, and contextual dimensions, little attention has been paid to the critical dimensions of Dewey’s thought. In what follows, I take the initial steps in recovering the critical features of Dewey’s pragmatism by developing my analysis along two lines. First, I sketch the general contours of the relationship between pragmatism and critical theory in order to account for and unpack the long-standing hostility of critical theorists toward pragmatism. Second, I argue that these hostilities are unwarranted, and that they have been passed to us in the form of a persistent inability to appreciate the critical features of Dewey’s pragmatism. Through an investigation of the philosophical underpinnings of Dewey’s pragmatism, I hope to show that Dewey’s democratic commitments to the transformatory potential of lived experience, to a reconstructed conception of individualism, and to the cultivation of reflective social intelligence might be viewed as the basis of a critical theory worthy of greater attention and appreciation. Moreover, I hope that this effort will open avenues of inquiry into what might be called a model of ‘‘critical pragmatism.’’ Polity (2006) 38, 519–542. doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300067