The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation As Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism

Sustainable telecommunications policies require simultaneous satisfaction of economic viability and political feasibility constraints, and meeting these constraints is increasingly difficult in a competitive regulatory regime. In prior research, Cherry has sought to provide a general analytical framework for designing sustainable telecommunications policies, relying primarily on legal and economic analyses and incorporating insights from the political science literature. Cherry and Bauer (2004) have recently enhanced this framework by incorporating insights from complexity theory. This paper expands upon the analysis in Cherry and Bauer (2004) to examine the implications for federalism in the U.S. This paper shows that, from the complexity theory perspective, federalism is a patching algorithm for policymaking that confers system advantages for adaptability through diversity and coupling of policymaking jurisdictions. Such diversity and coupling is important for adaptability of the policymaking process itself, by providing mechanisms for both experimentation and stability that are essential for development of sustainable policies. In addition, as a coevolving complex adaptive system, a federalism regime evolves over time. This paper asserts that, as for sustainable environmental policies, further evolution in the federalism regime is needed to improve the adaptive properties of the U.S. policymaking processes to provide sustainable telecommunications policies. Such evolution will require greater flexibility in the sharing of jurisdictional powers as well as the utilization of new research tools to enhance development of robust and adaptive policies. An important implication of the complex theory perspective is that policies of complete federal preemption, and particularly full deregulation, must be approached with great caution. This is because such policies eliminate the adaptive properties of a more highly patched and coupled policymaking system. * The views in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the Federal Communications Commission, any Commissioners, or staff. The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation As Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism Barbara A. Cherry Senior Counsel Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis Federal Communications Commission 445 12 Street, SW Washington, D.C. 20554, USA [email protected]