Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining

نویسنده

  • David A. Matsa
چکیده

Market power in the hands of a supplier — such as a labor union — affects a firm’s optimal debt policy. If a firm maintains a high level of liquidity, workers may be encouraged to raise wage demands. In the presence of external finance constraints, a firm has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service payments to improve its bargaining position. Using both cross-sectional estimates of firm-level collective bargaining coverage as well as state changes in labor law to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that firms indeed appear to use financial leverage strategically to influence collective bargaining negotiations. These estimates suggest that strategic incentives from union bargaining have a substantial impact on financing decisions. JEL Classifications: D21, G32, J51, L14

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تاریخ انتشار 2006