Nash equilibria sets in mixed extension of 2x2x2 games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We describe the Nash equilibria set as an intersection of graphs of players’ best responses. The problem of Nash equilibria set construction for three-person extended 2× 2× 2 games is studied. Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 90C05, 90C10, 90C29, 90C31.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- The Computer Science Journal of Moldova
دوره 13 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005