Hume's Theory of Mental Representation

Hume’s arguments in the Treatise require him to employ not only the copy principle, which explains the intrinsic properties of perceptions, but also a thesis that explains the representational content of a perception. I propose that Hume holds the semantic copy principle, which states that a perception represents that of which it is a copy. Hume employs this thesis in a number of his most important arguments, and his doing so enables him to answer an important objection concerning the status of the copy principle. I further argue that the semantic copy principle is necessary, a priori, and discovered through an analysis of our general idea of representational content. The precise status of Hume’s copy principle—the thesis that every simple idea is a copy of some simple impression—has long been a t horny issue among Hume scholars.1 On the one hand, if the copy principle is a mere empirical generalization, it lacks the authority whereby it can be used to refute the claims of Hume’s predecessors that we have such controversial ideas as those of necessary connection, the external world, or the self.2 It would seem that each of these, rather than being undermined by the copy principle, would be counterexamples to it. On the other hand, the only alternative to the copy principle’s being an empirical generalization would be that it is an a priori principle. This alternative is unattractive for at least two reasons. First, accepting it severely undermines Hume’s commitment to pursuing a purely empirical science of man. Secondly, Hume explicitly denies that there can be any a priori principles regarding the causal connections between ideas, and the copy principle clearly has a causal component. David Landy is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco CA 94132. Email: [email protected].