Daniel John Povinelli Behind the ape ’ s appearance : Escaping anthropocentrism in the study of other minds

Look at Megan. Not just at her distinctively chimpanzee features – her accentuated brow ridge, her prognathic face, her coarse, black hair – but at the totality of her being; her darting eyes, her slow, studied movements, the gestures she makes as her companion, Jadine, passes nearby. Can there be any doubt that behind certain obvious differences in her appearance, resides a mind nearly identical to our own? Indeed, is it even possible to spend an afternoon with her and not come to this conclusion – not implant a human mind inside her chimpanzee skull? Upon reflection, you will probably acknowledge that her mind is not identical to ours. “But surely it’s not qualitatively different, either,” you will still insist. “I mean, it’s obvious from watching her that we share the same kind of mind.” So, how can I devote the remainder of this essay to questioning the human-like quality of Megan’s mind? Faced with the overwhelming similarity in the spontaneous, everyday behavior _______________________________________________ Daniel J. Povinelli is a Professor of Cognitive Science at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, and is Director of the Cognitive Evolution Group and the Center for Child Studies. He is a James S. McDonnell Centennial Fellow, former recipient of a National Science Foundation Presidential Young Investigator Award, and recipient of the American Psychological Association’s Distinguished Scientific Award for an Early Career Contribution to Psychology. He is the author of numerous journal articles and book chapters and of Folk physics for apes: The chimpanzee’s theory of how the world works (Oxford University Press, 2000).