Interval Subset Sum and Uniform-Price Auction Clearing

نویسندگان

  • Anshul Kothari
  • Subhash Suri
  • Yunhong Zhou
چکیده

We study the interval subset sum problem (ISSP), a generalization of the classic subset-sum problem, where given a set of intervals, the goal is to choose a set of integers, at most one from each interval, whose sum best approximates a target integer T . For the cardinality constrained interval subset-sum problem (kISSP), at least kmin and at most kmax integers must be selected. Our main result is a fully polynomial time approximation scheme for ISSP, with time and space both O(n · 1/ε). For kISSP, we present a 2-approximation with time O(n), and a FPTAS with time O(n · kmax · 1/ε). Our work is motivated by auction clearing for uniform-price multi-unit auctions, which are increasingly used by security firms to allocate IPO shares, by governments to sell treasury bills, and by corporations to procure a large quantity of goods. These auctions use the uniform price rule—the bids are used to determine who wins, but all winning bidders receive the same price. For procurement auctions, a firm may even limit the number of winning suppliers to the range [kmin, kmax]. We reduce the auction clearing problem to ISSP, and use approximation schemes for ISSP to solve the original problem. The cardinality constrained auction clearing problem is reduced to kISSPand solved accordingly.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply

In the uniform-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1 N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead ...

متن کامل

Experimental Evidence about the Persistence of High Prices in a Soft-Cap Auction for Electricity

I. Introduction The high prices for electricity in California during the summer of 2000 led to a substantial amount of regulatory and political intervention. Price caps were lowered and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed that a new type of " soft-cap " auction be adopted to replace the uniform price auction. This auction combines a standard uniform price auction with a dis...

متن کامل

Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions∗

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm’s minimum acceptable price and the maximum qu...

متن کامل

Auctions : Will they eliminate traditional underwriting inefficiencies ? Sara McDonald HEC , University of Lausanne MBF

Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the United States have been mainly underwritten and sold using the bookbuilding method; a method inherently riddled with inefficiencies and information asymmetries. Consequently, IPOs in the U.S. (and other countries for that matter) have been persistently underpriced, at the expense of both the issuing firm and public investors. Alternative underwriting proce...

متن کامل

EPA’s New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation

The EPA has designed a new call auction institution for trading allowances to emit sulfur dioxide. This paper reports twelve laboratory markets that evaluate the performance of this new institution relative to the more commonly observed uniform price call auction. We find Ž . Ž . that the uniform price call auction i is more efficient, ii induces more truthful revelation of Ž . Ž . underlying v...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2005