Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell. World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore (2013)

The general framework of this volume is that of game theory, with multiple participants (“players”) who interact repeatedly over time. The players may be people, corporations, nations, computers—even genes. See the Handbook of Game Theory (Aumann and Hart 1994, 2002, 2004; Young and Zamir 2012). Many of the standard concepts of game theory are static by their very nature. This is certainly true of the central concept of strategic equilibrium, both in its classical form of Nash equilibrium (Nash 1950) and in its extended form of correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974). Indeed, an equilibrium situation is such that, once the players happen to find themselves in it, no player has an incentive to move away from it. However, these equilibrium concepts say nothing about how such situations are reached, i.e., about their dynamic basis. World Scientific Series in Economic Theory – Volume 4, World Scientific Publishing, 2012 (forthcoming). Center for the Study of Rationality, Department of Economics, and Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel. E-mail : [email protected]; URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart. Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. Email : [email protected].